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COMMENTS
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND
ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSIVE TACTICS:
IVANHOE PARTNERS v. NEWMONT
MINING CORP.
Recent history has seen a tremendous increase in hostile cor-
porate takeovers, many of which give rise to complex litigation.'
The Williams Act2 (the "Act") was enacted to regulate tender of-
fers,3 which have become the principal means of consummating
I See, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 4-5 (2d Cir. 1983)
(plaintiff corporation unsuccessfully challenged lock-up option created by target company
attempting to merge with management-friendly corporation), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052
(1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir.) (corporate raider una-
ble to obtain judicial rescission of defensive sale of treasury shares and lock-up option), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 291, 297 (7th
Cir.) (defensive acquisitions made to lessen corporation's appeal to bidders upheld), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). See generally Bartlett & Andrews, The Standstill Agreement:
Legal and Business Considerations Underlying a Corporate Peace Treaty, 62 B.U.L. REV.
143, 143 (1982) (strong competition has promoted increased number of mergers and acquisi-
tions, and intensified tension between issuing corporations and corporate investors); Lipton
& Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities-An Update, 40 Bus.
LAW. 1403, 1411-26 (1985) (review of takeover methods and responses); Sommer, Hostile
Tender Offers: Time for a Review of Fundamentals, in TENDER OFFERS 251-72 (M. Stein-
berg ed. 1985) (overview of recent takeover phenomenon); Note, The Business Judgment
Rule in a Hostile Tender Offer: Tearing at the Seams of a Confusing Doctrine-Norln v.
Rooney Pace, Inc., 17 RUTGERS L.J. 321, 321 n.1 (1986) (50 tender offers in 1972, 205 in
1981).
2 Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 781(1), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (West 1981 & Supp. 1988)); see 13A B. Fox & E. Fox, Busi-
NESS ORGANIZATIONS-CoRPORATE AcQuISrrIONS AND MERGERS § 27.04(2), at 27-38 (1987)
("Williams Act amendments to the Exchange Act provide for federal regulation of tender
offers").
3 See 13A B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 2, § 27.01, at 27-5 ("[a] tender offer is an offer
to shareholders of a corporation to purchase stock of that corporation"). The tender offer,
"[ain organized attempt to acquire a substantial percentage of the outstanding stock of a
[target] corporation by making an attractive offer to its shareholders[,] is frequently the
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hostile takeovers. The Act is designed to give "target" companies
time to mobilize defensive plans and respond to such tender of-
fers.4 Consequently, hostile tender offers have often been met with
most effective method available to the would-be acquirer for achieving the desired [take-
over]." Id. Once the tender offer is announced, a shareholder of the target company may
either keep his shares, sell them in the securities market, or tender them to the tender
offeror. See Panter, 646 F.2d at 283. If a substantial number of shareholders exchange their
shares for the consideration provided by the tender offeror, the takeover will be successful.
See Sommer, supra note 1, at 251.
The Williams Act failed to explicitly define a tender offer; instead, Congress left the
task to the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC"). See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F.
Supp. 783, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1069 (1983); Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,107, at 96,147 (N.D. Ohio 1979); T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 11.13, at 348 (1985). The SEC, however, has also avoided formulating an objective defini-
tion in order "to assure that disclosure rules can be applied flexibly to the plethora of spe-
cial bid situations." H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 297, at 820 n.39 (3d
ed. 1983). The SEC has provided guidance in identifying "tender offers" by identifying cer-
tain indicative characteristics. See Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 823-24. These characteristics
include:
(1) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of an
issuer; (2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3)
offer to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market price; (4) terms
of the offer are firm rather than negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of a
fixed number of shares, often subject to a fixed maximum number to be pur-
chased; (6) offer open only a limited period of time; (7) offeree subjected to pres-
sure to sell his stock.
Id.; see also Hoover, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,107, at
96,148 (factors originally formulated by SEC to define tender offers).
Tender offers have often been recognized as advantageous to shareholders even if their
corporation never actually becomes a target. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of
a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161, 1173-74
(1981). "The process of monitoring by outsiders poses a continuous threat of takeover if
performance lags. Managers will attempt to reduce agency costs in order to reduce the
chance of takeover, and the process of reducing agency costs leads to higher prices for
shares." Id. at 1174; see also Harrington, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The Legal Propri-
ety of Defenses Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 977, 981-83 (1983)
(hostile takeover attempts foster market efficiency and shareholder autonomy). But see 13A
B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 2, § 27.06[1][b], at 27-166 (discussing possible detriments of
takeover bid to corporation).
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 1162. Prior to the passage of the Williams
Act, shareholders were forced to decide quickly whether or not to sell their shares to corpo-
rate raiders since "offerors could limit the time an offer would be available, require that
tenders be irrevocable, or specify that if the offer should be oversubscribed the first shares
to be tendered would be the first purchased." Id. at 1162-63 & n.6. The Act was framed so
as "to insure that public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their
stock will not be required to respond without adequate information regarding the qualifica-
tions and intentions of the offering party." Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58
(1975). However, the draftsmen of the Act took care "to avoid tipping the balance of regula-
tion either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid." S.
REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
powerful anti-takeover strategies. 5 The decision by corporate direc-
tors to utilize such defensive tactics in response to a takeover at-
tempt is generally protected by the business judgment rule.6 Under
the business judgment rule, actions by a board of directors are pre-
sumed to be in good faith, and will not be disturbed by the courts
absent a clear abuse of discretion.7 Traditionally, the standard by
5 See Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can Federal Law be Mobil-
ized to Overcome the Business Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP. L. 337, 339-43 (1983). Defensive
tactics are the strategic maneuvers used by target companies to evade a takeover "or at least
to succumb on more favorable terms." Id. at 339. Among these defenses are: "golden
parachutes," "poison pills," "pac-man," and "lock-up" defenses. See id. at 341-42.
A "golden parachute" is a contract designed to provide bonuses or long-term salary
guarantees to executives of the target in the event that corporate control changes hands and
executives are terminated. See id. at 341 (overview of golden parachute as anti-takeover
defense). See generally Note, Golden Parachutes: Executive Employment Contracts, 40
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1117, 1119-20 (1983) ("golden parachutes provide executives with lu-
crative severance packages").
"Poison pills" generally allow all target shareholders to sell common shares at a pre-
scribed premium or to purchase common stock at a set discount when any single entity
acquires a certain percentage of the company, thereby making the target less attractive. See
13A B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 2, § 27.07[2][e], at 27-221. See generally Helman &
Junewicz, A Fresh Look at Poison Pills, 42 Bus. LAw. 771, 772-74 (1987) (discussing history
of poison pill plans).
The "pac-man" defense is a tender offer, made by the target company, for the stock of
the original offeror. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 n.6 (Del. 1985);
DeMott, Pac-Man Tender Offers, in TENDER OFFERs 123, 123-41 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985).
In a "lock-up," the target corporation gives a favored prospective bidder-the "white
knight"-an option to buy shares of the target corporation, thereby allowing him to have a
distinct advantage over other bidders. See Note, Lock-Up Options: Toward a State Law
Standard, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1068, 1068 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Lock-Up Options].
In addition, target companies have often entered into standstill agreements with third
parties. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1338 (Del.
1987). "The standstill agreement is, in essence, a corporate peace treaty designed to inject a
degree of stability, certainty, and cooperation into the relationship between the issuer and a
major investor." Bartlett & Andrews, supra note 1, at 144. Standstill agreements enhance
the third party's ability to "sweep [the] street" through a "rapid acquisition of securities on
the open market during and shortly after the pendency of a tender offer for the same class
of securities." See Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1337 n.3.
6 See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
7 See 13A B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 2, § 27.06[4], at 27-187. The business judgment
rule is best described as a presumption that directors' decisions are informed, made in good
faith, and motivated by the corporation's best interests. Id.; see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984). The rule is designed to protect management against liability for rea-
sonable actions which ultimately prove to be faulty. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d
287, 294 (3d Cir. 1980) (directors not penalized if judgment reasonable at time made), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); S. LORNE, AcQuismONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED AND CON-
TESTED TRANSACTIONS § 4.05[3][a], at 4-101 (1985). It has been noted that:
Courts are willing to defer to directors because it is the board's duty to manage
the affairs of the corporation and because court's often consider themselves ill-
equipped to second-guess business decisions. The presumption of sound business
1988]
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which a board's discretionary acts are evaluated is one of corporate
reasonableness.' Recently, in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Min-
judgment allows the directors to prevail whenever they can articulate a rational,
unselfish business purpose for their actions.
Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison
Pill" Preferred, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1064, 1069 (1984).
The good faith requirement has often been construed to mean that the business judg-
ment rule affords protection only to disinterested directors. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see
also Note, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.: A New Era of Fiduciary Duty, 38 BAYLOR
L. REv. 687, 698-700 (1986) [hereinafter Note, A New Era] (board's defensive tactics invalid
where sole purpose to perpetuate control); Note, Discrimination Against Shareholders in
Opposing a Hostile Takeover, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1319, 1321 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Dis-
crimination] (business judgment rule will not be applied "where a board's self interest pre-
dominates"). "[D]irectors can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to
derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing . . . . " Aronson,
473 A.2d at 812. When a board's self-interest predominates, courts will not apply the busi-
ness judgment rule and all aspects of the transaction must be deemed objectively fair to the
shareholders. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 115
(Del. Ch. 1986). The burden of proof then shifts to the director to prove that the transaction
was fair and reasonable. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). How-
ever, the parameters of this fiduciary duty are so ambiguous that it is often invoked by both
plaintiffs and defendants. Note, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.: Unbridled Discretion of
Management to Resist Hostile Tender Offers, 33 MERCER L. REV. 647, 649 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter Note, Unbridled Discretion]. "Shareholders sue... and claim that the duty is breached
when an offer is thwarted which would have resulted in their economic enrichment. Man-
agement counters that the duty makes it incumbent upon the directors to resist offers that
they determine to be detrimental ... ." Id. at 650. Generally, the business judgment rule
only marginally inhibits board action since "[iun practical application, there are only rudi-
ments of limits placed on the discretion of management to pursue whatever courses of ac-
tion directors deem necessary." Id.
8 See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984). The members
of a corporation's board of directors have a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to both the
corporation and its shareholders. See id.; Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F.
Supp. 623, 633 (D. Md. 1982); S. LORNE, supra note 7, § 4.05[3][a], at 4-101, 4-102. The
power of the board to act is tempered by this fundamental duty and obligation to protect
the corporate enterprise, including the stockholders, from any reasonably perceived harm.
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Cheff v. Mathes,
199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964). Accordingly, the business judgment rule guides the courts in
the determination of whether directors have adhered to their fiduciary duty. See Note, Un-
bridled Discretion, supra note 7, at 650.
In Norlin, the court stated that the duty requires care that a "reasonably prudent per-
son in a similar position would use under similar circumstances." See Norlin, 744 F.2d at
264. See generally Steinberg, The American Law Institute's Draft Restatement on Corpo-
rate Governance: The Business Judgment Rule, Related Principles, and Some General Ob-
servations, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 295, 301-06 (1983) (rational basis is component of business
judgment rule according to ALI). The courts have struggled to determine standards which
would preclude invocation of the business judgment rule when bad faith entrenchment tac-
tics are strongly suspected. See, e.g., Johnson, 629 F.2d at 293 (presumption of business
judgment rule remains unless sole or primary motive is to retain control). The Panter court
summarized the business judgment rule and its effect on directors: "In the absence of fraud,
bad faith, gross overreaching or abuse of discretion, courts will not interfere with the exer-
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ing Corp.,9 the Supreme Court of Delaware found it reasonable,
under the business judgment rule, for a target company to enter
into a standstill agreement'0 and increase its dividends in order to
facilitate a "street sweep" of its stock by a preferred buyer."
In Ivanhoe, Ivanhoe Partners and Ivanhoe Acquisition Corpo-
ration ("Ivanhoe") commenced a hostile takeover of Newmont
Mining Corporation ("Newmont").' 2 It did so by making a tender
offer for forty-two percent of Newmont's shares at ninety-five dol-
lars per share, a bid it later increased to one hundred five dollars
per share.'" After investigation, Newmont determined that these
cise of business judgment by corporate directors." Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F.
Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Whittaker
Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 950 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (absent bad faith or gross abuse of
discretion, business judgment of directors not to be interfered with by courts). See generally
Note, supra note 1, at 322 (duty of loyalty requires directors of corporation to avoid self-
dealing). However, courts will generally not hold management liable for good faith errors in
judgment. See 13A B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 2, § 27.06[4], at 27-187. The determinative
question thus becomes "management's state of mind at the time of the [challenged] transac-
tion." Johnson, 629 F.2d at 294; see also Cheff, 199 A.2d at 555 (directors not to be penal-
ized for mistake when judgment appeared reasonable at time of decision).
It is only indirectly that the business judgment rule is an enforceable standard of con-
duct for corporate management since it is "primarily a tool of judicial review," Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), and it
has often been reaffirmed and expanded. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch.),
aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974); see Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971). Accordingly, stockholders "cannot secure the aid of a court to correct what appear to
them to be mistakes of judgment on the part of the officers." See Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 343 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). At most, directors will only
be liable for gross negligence if they make a good faith decision. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812;
Solash v. Telex Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,608, at
97,728 (Del. Ch. 1988). Absent such conduct, the shareholders' remedy is generally limited
to voting out undesirable directors. See Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 685
(E.D. Pa. 1985); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 116
(1979).
9 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
10 See supra note 5 (discussing standstill agreements and other defensive tactics).
Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1343-44. See generally supra note 5 (discussing street sweep).
12 Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1338-39. A takeover attempt is said to be "hostile" when tender
or exchange offers are made directly to shareholders without management approval or nego-
tiation. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEovERs AND FREEzEs § 1.01[1], at 1-4 (1984).
13 Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1339. These offers were made after Ivanhoe's proposal to ac-
quire all of Newmont's outstanding stock proved futile. Id. at 1339. Moreover, Ivanhoe had
already acquired 9.95% of Newmont stock, intending to release Consolidated Gold Fields
PLC ("Gold Fields"), which owned a twenty-six percent interest in Newmont from a previ-
ous standstill agreement, in the hopes that Gold Fields would ally itself with Ivanhoe. Id. at
1338. However, Gold Fields failed to respond as Ivanhoe expected and consequently the
tender offer was made. Id. at 1339.
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offers were inadequate. 4 Newmont then declared a large dividend
in order to expedite a street sweep by Consolidated Gold Fields
PLC ("Gold Fields"), its largest shareholder. 15 Additionally, in an
effort to maintain its independence, Newmont signed a standstill
agreement with Gold Fields allowing Gold Fields to purchase only
up to 49.9% of Newmont stock.' 6  Soon thereafter, facilitated by
the dividend, Gold Fields "swept the street,' 17 purchasing approxi-
mately 15.8 million Newmont shares at ninety-eight dollars per
share.'" The Court of Chancery of Delaware granted Ivanhoe's re-
quest for a temporary restraining order prohibiting any future
trading by Gold Fields in Newmont stock.'9 The court later denied
the motion for a preliminary injunction because Gold Fields and
Newmont had agreed to amend their standstill agreement in the
interim.2 0 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, con-
cluding that the directors were protected by the business judgment
rule since no fiduciary duty was breached.2'
Writing for the court, Justice Moore indicated that Newmont's
board could have properly determined that the Ivanhoe tender of-
fer threatened corporate policy and effectiveness.22 The court rea-
soned that the street sweep, in conjunction with the large dividend
and the standstill agreements, was a reasonable response to the
Ivanhoe threat23 since it was "an essential part of Newmont's de-
fensive plan, which enabled Newmont to maintain its independent
status for the benefit of its other stockholders. '12 " Therefore, the
14 Id.
" Id. at 1339-40. The dividend was to be financed by Newmont's sale of its non-gold
assets and it "became the linchpin for negotiating the new standstill agreement." Id. More-
over, it would make Newmont a less attractive target by reducing its liquidity. Id.
1" Id. at 1340. The agreement did, however, limit Gold Fields' representation on
Newmont's board to forty percent of the total directors. Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
" Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585, 590 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 535
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
2 Id. at 610. The amendment gave "the independent stockholders . . . the right to
elect 60% of the Board, and the power to replace all non-Gold Fields directors." Id. at 609.
21 See Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1345-46.
22 See id. at 1342. Ivanhoe was controlled by T. Boone Pickens, Jr., who was celebrated
for his involvement in attempts to acquire and break up other companies. Id. Gold Fields
also posed a realistic threat. Id.
23 Id. at 1343-44.
24 Id. at 1344. The court was not persuaded that the street sweep had any coercive
effect. Id. The increased dividend allocated the non-gold assets to the Newmont sharehold-
ers, and this became the catalyst needed to facilitate Gold Fields' street sweep. Id. at 1343.
The restrictions in the standstill agreement guaranteed the continued independence of
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court concluded that the Newmont directors acted reasonably and
their actions were shielded by the business judgment rule.25
The Ivanhoe court relied upon the standards enunciated in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,26 in finding that the actions
of the Newmont board of directors were reasonable.2 7 It is submit-
ted, however, that the court erred in its application of those princi-
ples. The defensive measures taken by Newmont went far beyond
those necessary to combat the threats posed by Ivanhoe and Gold
Fields. This Comment will analyze the reasonableness doctrine and
will assert that the Newmont board did not act reasonably under
the circumstances. It is suggested that the sole motivation behind
the Newmont board's acts was self-interest, in breach of its fiduci-
ary duties to its shareholders. This Comment will also analogize
the tactics employed by the Newmont board to those used by the
board of directors in the landmark case of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.2s and conclude that, contrary to the
Ivanhoe court's findings, the Newmont board did indeed act in
breach of its fiduciary duties.
THE Unocal STANDARD
The business judgment rule, in some form, is applied almost
universally in matters of corporate decision making.29 In Unocal
Newmont and protected its public shareholders "from being squeezed out by an unbridled
majority shareholder." Id. The court specifically rejected the lower court's finding that the
agreement had entrenchment effects which might "render Newmont 'takeover proof' for up
to 10 years," Ivanhoe Partners, 533 A.2d at 590, opining that the agreement merely ensured
an independent board and did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d
at 1345-46.
11 Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1345. Ivanhoe was found to be the sole bidder for Newmont
and, consequently, the board had no obligation to obtain the highest price for the benefit of
its shareholders. Id.
" 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
217 Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1337.
28 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
29 See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986)
(in evaluating corporate fiduciary's duty of care, courts adhere to business judgment rule);
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-94 (7th Cir.) (breach of fiduciary duty
claims analyzed under business judgment rule), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); AC Ac-
quisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) (when reviewing
propriety of corporate transaction challenged as breach of duty, court applies business judg-
ment rule); see also Note, Corporate Law-The Business Judgment Rule Imposes Proce-
dural Requirements on Corporate Directors-Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985), 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 109, 109-10 (1986) (business judgment rule has developed into
integral part of American corporate law).
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Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., a new standard was established,
compelling management to overcome an initial burden before the
business judgment rule would be applied.30 This preliminary bur-
den, adopted in most jurisdictions, 31 requires management to show
reasonable grounds for having believed that corporate policy and
effectiveness were in danger.3 2 Newmont's management perceived
such a threat from T. Boone Pickens, Jr., who controlled Ivan-
hoe.33  However, Gold Fields also posed a tangible threat to
Newmont, as evidenced by the strong possibility that it could ac-
quire control of Newmont at any time, either alone or in alliance
with Ivanhoe.3 4
Under Unocal, management also must show that the defensive
measure taken was a reasonable response to the threat posed.3 5
so See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55. In holding that the directors had the burden of
proving good faith, the court stated: "A corporation does not have unbridled discretion to
defeat any perceived threat by any Draconian means available." Id. at 955; cf. Hanson
Trust PLC, 781 F.2d at 273 (under New York law, even in takeover context, initial burden
rests with plaintiff).
" See Note, supra note 29, at 110.
32 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Directors meet that burden "by showing good faith and
reasonable investigation." Id. (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548,
555 (1964)). This standard is "designed to ensure that a defensive measure to thwart or
impede a takeover is indeed motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corpo-
ration and its stockholders, which in all circumstances must be free of any fraud or other
misconduct." Id.; accord Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180; Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); AC Acquisitions, 519 A.2d at 111-12.
11 Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1342. Pickens "had been involved in several attempts to acquire
and break-up other corporations, resulting in ... severe restructuring of the target compa-
nies." Id. In addition, defendants perceived the Ivanhoe actions as "classic elements of Mr.
Pickens' typical modus operandi." Id.
3' Id. Ivanhoe deliberately acquired 9.95% of Newmont shares to release Gold Fields
from their previous standstill agreement. Id. The agreement prohibited Gold Fields from
acquiring more than a 331/ % interest in Newmont unless a third party held 9.9% or more
of the outstanding shares. Id. at 1338. Although Gold Fields did not immediately terminate
the previous standstill, the threat remained that it would do so to gain control unilaterally
or with Ivanhoe. Id. at 1342.
15 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Directors are charged with employing defense measures
reasonably related to the particular threat because of their fiduciary duty to the corporation
and its stockholders. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 180 (Del. 1986); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). This fiduciary duty
requires the directors to "analyze the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corpo-
rate enterprise." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Factors to be considered by the directors when
formulating a reasonable defense include the "inadequacy of the price offered, nature and
timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies' other than share-
holders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees ... ), the risk of nonconsummation, and the
quality of securities being offered in the exchange." Id.; see also Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357
(plan vesting common stockholders with right to purchase preferred stock at half value
upon occurrence of tender offer held reasonable); AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton &
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The Ivanhoe court applied this reasonableness standard to the ac-
tions taken by the Newmont board and found such actions to be
reasonable.36 It is submitted, however, that although the street
sweep in and of itself was not unreasonable,3 7 the standstill agree-
ment and resulting "lock-up" exceeded the bounds of reasonable-
ness. Integral components of the standstill agreement-the in-
creased dividend and the street sweep-were replete with self-
perpetuating consequences, casting serious doubt upon the asser-
tion that such responses were reasonable defensive tactics. 8
As a practical matter, the standstill agreement assured the de-
feat of any hostile takeover because for ten years Gold Fields was
bound to vote its 49.9 percent interest for the Newmont board's
director-nominees and was precluded from transferring their
shares free of this restriction.39 Rather than representing a reason-
able strategy designed merely to prevent the realization of an inad-
equate bid, it is suggested that the standstill agreement was a dis-
proportionate response to the threat posed. Such entrenching of a
Co., 519 A.2d 103, 113 (Del. Ch. 1986) (stock option held unreasonable where shareholders
were precluded from accepting tender offer).
31 Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1343. The court also found that because Newmont's defensive
actions were so "inextricably related" to one another, they could be considered to be a single
response to the threat posed for purposes of determining the reasonableness of the board's
actions. Id.
37 Id. The street sweep was a Gold Fields defense to protect its own substantial interest
in the company. Id. As a stockholder, Gold Fields was not barred from acting in its own
interest. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958; Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v.
Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 622, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (1947). This rule for stockholders is in
marked contrast to the rule governing directors' activities, which requires that they be both
disinterested and free from self-dealing. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176 (lock-ups and related
agreements permitted if "untainted by director interest or other breaches of fiduciary
duty"); see also Note, Discrimination, supra note 7, at 1327 (discussing fiduciary ramifica-
tions of board of directors' self-tender offer in Unocal).
" See Ivanhoe Partners, 533 A.2d at 598; see also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying
text (discussing terms of standstill agreement). However, one clause in the standstill agree-
ment was free from self-perpetuating effects. See Ivanhoe Partners, 533 A.2d at 598. It
entitled Gold Fields to elect a percentage of directors, equal to the percentage of voting
stock it held, up to forty percent of the positions to be filled. Id.; see also Condec Corp. v.
Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 363, 230 A.2d 769, 776-77 (1967) (directors shown to
have perpetuated own control by diluting offeror's ownership). See generally Bartlett & An-
drews, supra note 1, at 143 ("[tlhe marshalling of a substantial block of stock by a new
investor may produce a bunker mentality in the issuer's boardroom").
11 Ivanhoe Partners, 533 A.2d at 609. Gold Fields' 49.9% interest in Newmont was
"locked up" by the standstill agreement because it "bound Gold Fields to vote its shares for
the Newmont Board's director-nominees." Id. at 608. In addition, it prevented Gold Fields
from later transferring the shares free of those restrictions. Id.
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board of directors can threaten the corporate structure.4" More-
over, the strategy pursued by the Newmont board divested the
shareholders of their inherent power to make decisions concerning
the tendering of shares.41
It is also asserted that the directors failed to satisfy the good
faith requirement of the business judgment rule in relation to the
threatened takeover because they were not sufficiently indepen-
dent or disinterested.42 Although a subsequent amendment to the
standstill agreement significantly reduced its potential for en-
trenchment,48 in determining management's state of mind a proper
40 See Note, supra note 7, at 1323 ("unimpeded takeover attempts should be en-
couraged in order to maintain the proper corporate structure"); see also Gilson, A Struc-
tural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
STAN. L. REv. 819, 837 (1981) ("efficient operation" should be management's key concern).
"I See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 635 (D. Md. 1982)
(stockholders entitled to exercise own judgment with regard to tendering of shares); Conoco
Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (equity demands that
stockholders not be denied opportunity to accept cash in tender offer despite interference
with proposed merger); Harrington, supra note 3, at 983 (tender offers are invitations to
stockholders, not directors). But see Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 686
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (board of directors empowered to accept or decline takeover bid). It has
been suggested that with the recent onslaught of aggressive corporate acquisitions, removal
of shareholder control over tender offers would drastically limit what has heretofore been an
important ownership right. See Quinn & Martin, The SEC Advisory Committee on Tender
Offers and its Aftermath-A New Chapter in Change of Control Regulation, in TENDER
OFFERS 21-23 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985).
42 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Good faith under the busi-
ness judgment rule is measured by a subjective standard, taking into account the director's
"state of mind at the time of the transaction." Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 294 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). It is asserted that the Newmont directors could
not have been acting in good faith in light of the aggressive nature of their defense, which
went beyond that required to meet the threat posed to the company and was clearly moti-
vated by their desire to perpetuate themselves in management. Consequently, the board
should not have been afforded the protection of the business judgment rule. See Whittaker
Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 950 (N.D. IlM. 1982) (business judgment rule not invoked
unless management has no personal interest in transaction); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (pro-
tection of business judgment rule can only be claimed by disinterested directors); Note, A
New Era, supra note 7, at 699 (courts invalidate defensive tactics if perpetuation of control
was primary purpose); see also supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing business
judgment rule). Although a showing of a motive to retain control is not sufficient to remove
the presumption, where the defensive tactic "is itself calculated to alter the structure of the
corporation . . . and results in a fundamental transfer of a power from one constituency
(shareholders) to another (the directors) the business judgment rule will not foreclose in-
quiry into the directors' action." Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del
Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
,3 See Ivanhoe Partners, 533 A.2d at 609. The original standstill agreement would have
had the effect of keeping "the Gold Fields tiger 'in the cage'" by binding it to vote for
nominees of the Newmont board in director elections. Id. at 608. The amendment unleashed
the "tiger" by permitting Gold Fields to elect forty percent of the board independently. Id.
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analysis demands consideration of both the original transaction
and the subsequent amendment.44 Since the corporate fiduciaries
of Newmont were self-interested when they set the terms of the
transaction and effectuated its consummation, all aspects of the
agreement must be deemed fair to bring it within the protection of
the business judgment rule.45
It is suggested that in failing to consider price and other eco-
nomic aspects of the proposed takeover threat, the Ivanhoe court's
determination was not based on a proper view of the substantive
fairness of the entire transaction. The reasonableness test posited
by Unocal mandates judicial scrutiny of such matters and is in-
tended to more clearly define the limits of justifiable board ac-
tions.48 By holding the self-interested acts of the Newmont board
to be within the realm of reasonableness, it is asserted that the
at 609. In addition, Gold Fields was permitted to transfer shares to third parties subject
only to secondary restrictions. Id.
4 See Johnson, 629 F.2d at 294; Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548,
555 (1964) (directors not penalized for honest mistake in judgment where action appeared
reasonable at time decision made); see also Karasik v. Pacific E. Corp., 21 Del. Ch. 81, 96,
180 A. 604, 611 (1935) (validity of settlement agreement in action against former directors
for mismanagement to be viewed as of date of settlement, not trial date).
Although the Court of Chancery found the resulting lock-up to be unreasonable at the
time of the transaction, the court also held that the amendment obviated the need for pre-
liminary injunctive relief. Ivanhoe Partners, 533 A.2d at 609-10.
41 AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986);
see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 33 Del. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (1952). Since self-interested directors lose the
strong presumption of the business judgment rule, the burden is no longer on the party
challenging management's decision. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Instead, once a prima
facie case of self-interest is made, the burden shifts to the directors to demonstrate that the
"transaction is fair and serves the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders."
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (New York law applied);
see also Minster Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(actions by board of directors taken to entrench itself shifted burden of proof to directors).
However, the business judgment rule is presumed applicable absent a showing "by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the directors' decisions were primarily based on perpetuat-
ing themselves in office .... lack of good faith, or being uninformed." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985).
", See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954; Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer De-
fenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 117, 118 (1986); Note, Dis-
crimination, supra note 7, at 1329 n.57 (author expresses confusion over reasonableness
standard espoused by Unocal but suggests it requires subjective criteria). Although the
courts must perform a case by case analysis, it is suggested that the Unocal test did, in fact,
delineate a uniform standard. Because of the potential conflict of interest, courts must re-
view the board's judgment carefully. It follows, therefore, that if a board's actions fail the
Unocal test, they will surely fail the additional scrutiny of an intrinsic fairness test. See
Oesterle, supra, at 118 n.7.
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Ivanhoe court allowed shareholder interests to be subordinated to
the interests of the corporate directors.
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY REQUIRED BY Revlon
The Ivanhoe court failed to follow judicial precedent requiring
a shift of the board's fiduciary duty from that of acting reasonably
in fending off hostile bidders, to maximizing shareholder profit
once a sale of the corporation became imminent. 7 While the Ivan-
hoe court acknowledged that directors are not required to declare
an open auction to sell the company when faced with a takeover
bid,'8 it failed to recognize that a sale was, in fact, inevitable and
therefore, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.
properly applied.'9 In Revlon, defensive board actions included
lock-up provisions50 whereby a "white knight ' 51 was given the op-
portunity to purchase two choice Revlon divisions at 100 to 175
million dollars below market value in the event that another bid-
der obtained forty percent of Revlon's shares.5 2 The court held
that authorizing Revlon's management to enter into negotiations
such as these was tantamount to announcing the sale of the com-
pany and, therefore, further defensive acts by the board would no
47 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986). Once the company is for sale, the question of defensive measures becomes moot and
the directors are "auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a
sale of the company." Id.; see T. HAZEN, supra note 3, § 11.20, at 92; see also Edelman v.
Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1986) (takeover triggers directors' duties to ob-
tain best price); Sanjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., 663 F. Supp. 614, 623 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (directors become "auctioneers" seeking highest bid).
8 See Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1344-45. A corporation has no obligation of self-sacrifice
when faced with such a challenge. See Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 228
(S.D. Ohio 1987); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 849 (D. Minn. 1986);
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958; Lipton, supra note 8, at 130.
'9 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). It is suggested that a "sale" was inevitable once Gold Fields
was released from the initial standstill agreement by Ivanhoe's actions. It was at this time
that Ivanhoe was actively pursuing a hostile takeover and Gold Fields was considering its
own purchase of control in Newmont in the open market. Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1339-40.
11 See supra note 5 (explaining "lock-ups" and other defensive tactics).
51 See 13A B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 2, § 27.07[2], at 27-223. A white knight is a
friendly party sought by the target company to obtain a sufficient portion of the target's
stock so as to block any takeover bid. Id.; see also Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 1, at
1421 (recent uses of "white knight" defensive arrangement by corporate enterprises).
52 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. The two Revlon divisions, Vision Care and National Health
Laboratories, were to be purchased for $525 million. Id. In addition, Revlon was required to
accept a no-shop provision and agreed not to have its management involved with the
merger. Id.
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longer be in good faith.5 3 While a preference for a white knight, to
the total exclusion of a hostile bidder, may be justified if the hos-
tile offer "adversely affects shareholder interests" and the offers
are relatively similar, directors do not fulfill their fiduciary duty
"by playing favorites with contending factions. ' 54 Thus, when the
lock-up forecloses further bidding, it operates to the shareholders'
detriment and is impermissible.5
It is asserted that Newmont's sale of its non-gold assets and
its declaration of increased dividends are analogous to the lock-up
options granted in Revlon in that the defensive plans in both cases
were designed to make the target companies less attractive to the
hostile bidders. Moreover, Newmont's schemes were designed to
facilitate the street sweep and support Gold Fields' acquisition of
the majority of shares." The Ivanhoe court consistently analyzed
the transactions in terms of the Ivanhoe threat and the Gold
Fields threat;67 however, the court too easily dismissed the fact
that Gold Fields was now the largest controlling shareholder and
would most likely determine the future of Newmont5 Further-
53 Id. at 182. In permitting negotiations with a third party for a buyout or merger,
management recognized that the breakup of the company was certain. Id.
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184; see also Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, 781
F.2d 264, 277 (2d Cir. 1986) ("lock-up" in favor of white knight invalidated since manage-
ment knew or should have known it would foreclose further bidding). But see Treadway
Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 383 (2d Cir. 1980) (favor shown to white knight upheld
since it was precondition to desired business combination). Thus, the only case in which
bidding should be terminated by a target board arises when the board is convinced that
normal bidding is over and a higher bid can only be elicited through a lock-up option. See
Oesterle, supra note 46, at 151; Note, Lock-Up Options, supra note 5, at 1076-82; cf. Ap-
plied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (man-
agement decision to turn shareholder list over to friendly offeror and to withhold same from
competing offeror held to offend congressional concern in adopting Williams Act that both
offeror and management have equal opportunity to fairly present their case).
" See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 282-83; Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 887
(6th Cir. 1986); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184; see also Hastings-Murtagh v. Texas Air Corp., 649
F. Supp. 479, 484 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (Delaware law allows "lock-up" if used to encourage bid-
der to submit offer rather than to preclude bidding); Thompson v. Enstar Corp., 509 A.2d
578, 583 (Del. Ch. 1984) ("lock-up" upheld where sole offer was contingent upon its adop-
tion); Note, Lock-Up Options, supra note 5, at 1077 (stockholders suffer when "lock-up"
ends bidding). But see Oesterle, supra note 46, at 151 ("[i]ronically, Revlon may be the rare
case in which a lock-up is a rational gamble").
51 See Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1344.
'1 See id. at 1345; see also Franklin, 'Reasonable' Revisited-Effect of Newmont on
Takeover Defenses Debated, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 1987, at 5, col. 2.
58 See Franklin, supra note 57, at 6, col. 2. "'It is clear Gold Fields controls and will
determine the destiny of Newmont notwithstanding a standstill agreement which simply
puts some independent directors' on the board." Id. (quoting Stephen Flood, senior partner
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more, it is submitted that the court's reasoning ignored the fact
that the Newmont board effectively acknowledged the inevitable
sale of the company by encouraging Gold Fields, as white knight,
to make an offer. Under Revlon, once it became apparent that
Newmont was bound for sale to a white knight, the directors' duty
changed to one of ensuring that the shareholders obtained the best
possible return on their investments. 9 Management, therefore,
breached its duty as "auctioneer[] charged with getting the best
price for the stockholders,"60 and it is suggested that the court
erred in not granting the consequent injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
In holding the Newmont directors' defensive measures to be
within the constraints placed on management by the Unocal deci-
sion, the Delaware Supreme Court has greatly expanded the busi-
ness judgment rule and stretched the bounds of reasonableness far
beyond what was initially contemplated. Consequently, future
plaintiffs in similar actions will be faced with the inordinate task
of proving management's actions "unreasonable." Moreover, by de-
parting from established precedent, the court has sanctioned here-
tofore improper board actions and, in so doing, has given the green
light to more aggressive and unrestricted management tactics in
dealing with future takeover attempts.
Elizabeth A. Adolff
at Willkie Farr & Gallagher, New York City).
"' See Edelman, 798 F.2d at 886; Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, 781 F.2d
264, 274 (2d Cir. 1986) (ending the bidding held to be breach of duty of due care); Revlon,
506 A.2d at 182 (held to be breach of duty of loyalty); supra note 47 and accompanying text
(discussing director's role when sale imminent).
60 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. But see Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829,
847 (D. Minn. 1986) (board not required to assume role of auctioneer where self-tender offer
made in response to an all cash tender offer).
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